

# Security of Fixed-Weight Repetitions of Special-Sound Multi-Round Interactive Proofs

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Edoardo Signorini

Joint work with Michele Battagliola, Riccardo Longo, Federico Pintore and Giovanni Tognolini

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# Interactive Proofs

A binary relation is a set  $R = \{(x, w)\}$  of statement-witness pairs.

## Goal


Prove the knowledge of a witness  $w$  for a public statement  $x$ .

## Public-coin

We consider interactive proofs where the challenges  $c_i$  are sampled uniformly at random.

**Prover**( $x, w$ )

**Verifier**( $w$ )



## Completeness

Honest provers (almost) always succeed in convincing a verifier.

## Soundness

A dishonest prover (almost) never convince a verifier that a false statement  $x \notin L_R = \{x \mid \exists w : (x, w) \in R\}$  is true.

## Zero-knowledge

No information about  $w$  is revealed.

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## Zero-knowledge

No information about  $w$  is revealed.

Soundness does not mean the prover knows a witness!

Informally, a dishonest prover  $\mathcal{P}^*$  (almost) never succeed without the knowledge of a witness  $w$ .

Knowledge soundness  $\iff$  exists a knowledge extractor  $\mathcal{E}$ .

### Knowledge Extractor

**Input:** Statement  $x$ , rewindable oracle access to a prover  $\mathcal{P}^*$ .

**Output:** A witness  $w$  such that  $(x, w) \in R$ .

Consider any (dishonest) prover  $\mathcal{P}^*$  against the protocol on statement  $x$  and a knowledge extractor  $\mathcal{E}$ .

- $\epsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*)$  is the success probability of  $\mathcal{P}^*$  on input  $x$ .
- $\kappa(|x|)$  is the *knowledge error* of the protocol.

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## Knowledge Soundness

If  $\varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*) > \kappa(|x|)$ , then  $\mathcal{E}$  extracts a witness  $w$  such that  $(x, w) \in R$  in expected running time at most

$$\frac{\text{poly}(|x|)}{\varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*) - \kappa(|x|)}.$$

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Knowledge Soundness is hard to prove in general!



From now on we restrict to  $\Sigma$ -protocols (i.e, 3-move protocols) with challenge space  $\text{Ch} = \{0, 1, \dots, N - 1\}$ .

## 2-out-of-N special-soundness

There exists an efficient algorithm to extract a witness  $w$  from 2 *colliding* accepting protocol transcripts  $(a, c, z)$  and  $(a, c', z')$  with  $c \neq c' \in \text{Ch}$ .

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## k-out-of-N special-soundness

There exists an efficient algorithm to extract a witness  $w$  from  $k$  *colliding* accepting protocol transcripts  $(a, c_1, z_1), \dots, (a, c_k, z_k)$  with pairwise distinct challenges  $c_1, \dots, c_k \in \text{Ch}$ .

k-out-of-N special-soundness implies knowledge soundness with  $\kappa = (k - 1)/N$ .

- In many applications we need the knowledge error to be negligible.
- The  $t$ -fold *parallel repetition*  $\Pi^t$  of a 2-out-of- $N$  special-sound  $\Sigma$ -protocol  $\Pi$  is still a proof of knowledge with knowledge error  $1/N^t$ .

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Basic reasoning for  $k = 2$  is to observe that  $\Pi^t$  is still  $l$ -special sound with  $l = (k - 1)t + 1$ .

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# Reducing the Knowledge Error

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## Theorem 2 [AF22]<sup>1</sup>

If  $\Pi$  has knowledge error  $\kappa$ , then  $\Pi^t$  has knowledge error  $\kappa^t$ .

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## Unbalanced Challenges

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Fewer large responses to be sent  $\implies$  smaller signature.



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## Research Question

*Does a fixed-weight repetition of a  $k$ -special-sound public-coin interactive proof enjoy knowledge soundness?*

Let  $\Pi$  be a  $k$ -out-of- $N$  special sound  $\Sigma$ -protocol, and let  $\mathcal{P}^*$  be a *deterministic* prover attacking  $\Pi$  on input a statement  $x$

- $\mathcal{P}^*$ 's first message  $a$  is fixed.
- $\mathcal{P}^* : Ch \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*, c \mapsto z$ .
- $\mathcal{P}^*$  is successful if  $(a, c, z)$  is an accepting transcript.

## Knowledge Extractor on $k$ -out-of- $N$ Special-Sound Protocols I

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- $\mathcal{P}^*$  is successful if  $(a, c, z)$  is an accepting transcript.

$\mathcal{P}^*$ 's behavior can be described by a binary vector  $H(\mathcal{P}^*)$  indexed by the challenges  $c_j$ .

$$H(\mathcal{P}^*) = \begin{pmatrix} c_0 & c_1 & c_2 & \dots & c_{N-2} & c_{N-1} \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

- $H(\mathcal{P}^*)[c_j] = 1$  corresponds to  $\mathcal{P}^*$  succeeding on input  $c_j$
- $H(\mathcal{P}^*)[c_j] = 0$  corresponds to  $\mathcal{P}^*$  failing on input  $c_j$
- The success probability  $\epsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*)$  of  $\mathcal{P}^*$  on input  $x$  is fraction of 1-entries.

Basic extraction algorithm:

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- $k$ . Samples random challenges  $c_k \neq c_1, \dots, c_{k-1}$  until  $H(\mathcal{P}^*)[c_k] = 1 \implies$  Expected time:

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## Knowledge Extractor on $k$ -out-of- $N$ Special-Sound Protocols II

Basic extraction algorithm:

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$\vdots$

- $k$ . Samples random challenges  $c_k \neq c_1, \dots, c_{k-1}$  until  $H(\mathcal{P}^*)[c_k] = 1 \implies$  Expected time:

$$\leq \frac{1}{\varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*) - (k-1)/N}.$$

Expected runtime  $\leq \frac{k}{\varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*) - (k-1)/N} \implies$  knowledge error  $(k-1)/N$ .

## 2-Fold Parallel Repetition

Consider  $\mathcal{P}^*$  attacking the  $t = 2$ -fold parallel repetition  $\Pi^t$ .

We can treat  $\mathcal{P}^*$  as a (deterministic) function where the first message  $(a_1, a_2)$  is fixed

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$$\mathcal{P}_1^* : c_1 \mapsto \left[ \begin{array}{l} c_2 \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Ch} \\ (z_1, z_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{P}^*(c_1, c_2) \end{array} \right] \mapsto z_1$$

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Notice that

$$\varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}_i^*) = \Pr[V(c_i, \mathcal{P}_i^*(c_i)) = 1] = \Pr[V(c, \mathcal{P}^*(c)) = 1] = \varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*),$$

where  $c_i \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Ch}$  and  $c \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Ch}^t$ .

### Knowledge Extractor

- Run the extractor  $\mathcal{E}$  for  $\Pi$  for both  $\mathcal{P}_1^*$  and  $\mathcal{P}_2^*$ .
- Hope that at least one of them succeed.
- The same analysis as before holds, even though  $\mathcal{P}_1^*$  and  $\mathcal{P}_2^*$  are not deterministic.

# Naive Extraction for 2-Fold Parallel Repetition

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This does not work!

- The obtained knowledge error is still  $(k - 1)/N$ .
- We hope to reduce knowledge error down to  $(k - 1)^2/N^2$ .

- Introduce a more fine-grained quality measure of success.
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### Punctured success probability

Define the following measure

$$\delta_k(x, \mathcal{P}^*) = \min_{S \subset \text{Ch}: |S|=k-1} \Pr[\mathcal{P}^*(C) \text{ succeeds} \mid C \notin S],$$

where  $C$  is a random variable uniformly random in  $\text{Ch}$ .

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### New Extractor

On a single invocation  $\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{P}^*}$  has expected runtime

$$\leq \frac{k}{\delta_k(x, \mathcal{P}^*)} \leq \frac{k(1 - \kappa)}{\epsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*) - \kappa},$$

where  $\kappa = \frac{k-1}{N}$ .

Consider again  $\mathcal{P}^*$  attacking the  $t = 2$ -fold parallel repetition  $\Pi^t$ .  
 $\mathcal{P}^*$ 's behaviour can be described by a binary matrix  $H(\mathcal{P}^*)$ :

$$H(\mathcal{P}^*) = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} c_0 & c_1 & c_2 & \dots & c_{N-2} & c_{N-1} \end{matrix} \\ \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} & \begin{matrix} c_0 \\ c_1 \\ c_2 \\ \vdots \\ c_{N-2} \\ c_{N-1} \end{matrix} \end{matrix}$$

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The behavior of  $\mathcal{P}_1^*$  (resp.  $\mathcal{P}_2^*$ ) can be described by looking at the columns (resp. rows) of  $H(\mathcal{P}^*)$ .


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
- $\delta_R(x, \mathcal{P}_1^*)$  is the fraction of 1-entries in blue region.
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By running the single instance extractor in parallel on  $\mathcal{P}_1^*$  and  $\mathcal{P}_2^*$ , the extraction probability is given by

$$\delta_r(x, \mathcal{P}_1^*) + \delta_r(x, \mathcal{P}_2^*) \geq \varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*) - \frac{(k-1)^2}{N^2}$$
$$\Rightarrow \max(\delta_r(x, \mathcal{P}_1^*), \delta_r(x, \mathcal{P}_2^*)) \geq \left( \varepsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*) - \frac{(k-1)^2}{N^2} \right) / 2$$

## Fixed-Weight Repetition

Consider  $\mathcal{P}^*$  attacking the  $(t, \omega)$ -fixed-weight repetition  $\Pi^{t, \omega}$ . The challenge space is given by  $\text{Ch}^{t, \omega} = \{c \in \text{Ch}^t : \text{wt}_0(c) = \omega\}$ .

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Again, we can treat  $\mathcal{P}^*$  as a (deterministic) function

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$$\mathcal{P}_i^* : c_i \mapsto \left[ \begin{array}{l} \bar{c} \leftarrow_{\$} \begin{cases} \text{Ch}^{t-1, \omega-1} & \text{if } c_i = 0 \\ \text{Ch}^{t-1, \omega} & \text{if } c_i \neq 0 \end{cases} \\ (z_1, \dots, z_t) \leftarrow \mathcal{P}^*(c = (c_i, \bar{c})) \end{array} \right] \mapsto z_i$$

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Notice that, if we take  $c_i \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Ch}$  it does not hold that  $\epsilon(x, \mathcal{P}_i^*) = \epsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*)$ , since  $c = (c_i, \bar{c})$  is not uniformly distributed in  $\text{Ch}^{t, \omega}$ .

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$$\mathcal{P}^* : \text{Ch}^{t, \omega} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*, \quad c \mapsto (z_1, \dots, z_t).$$

We can define  $t$  probabilistic provers  $\mathcal{P}_1^*, \dots, \mathcal{P}_t^*$  attacking a single invocation of  $\Pi$

$$\mathcal{P}_i^* : c_i \mapsto \left[ \begin{array}{l} \bar{c} \leftarrow_{\$} \begin{cases} \text{Ch}^{t-1, \omega-1} & \text{if } c_i = 0 \\ \text{Ch}^{t-1, \omega} & \text{if } c_i \neq 0 \end{cases} \\ (z_1, \dots, z_t) \leftarrow \mathcal{P}^*(c = (c_i, \bar{c})) \end{array} \right] \mapsto z_i$$

Notice that, if we take  $c_i \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Ch}$  it does not hold that  $\epsilon(x, \mathcal{P}_i^*) = \epsilon(x, \mathcal{P}^*)$ , since  $c = (c_i, \bar{c})$  is not uniformly distributed in  $\text{Ch}^{t, \omega}$ .

We need to sample  $c_i$  according to a particular distribution over  $\text{Ch}$ .

## “Generalized” Punctured Success Probability

Let  $\mathcal{D}$  a probability distribution over  $D \subset \text{Ch}$  with  $|D| \geq k$ . We define the success probability of  $\mathcal{P}^*$  restricted on  $\mathcal{D}$  as

$$\varepsilon(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{D}) = \Pr[\mathcal{P}^*(C) \text{ succeeds}],$$

where  $C$  is a random variable being distributed as  $\mathcal{D}$ . When  $\mathcal{D}$  is the uniform distribution over  $\text{Ch}$ , then  $\varepsilon(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{D}) = \varepsilon(\mathcal{P}^*)$ .

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### Restricted punctured success probability

$$\delta_k(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{D}) = \min_{S \subset D: |S| < k} \Pr[\mathcal{P}^*(C) \text{ succeeds} \mid C \notin S],$$

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## Extension of [AttFeh22, Lemma 2]

There exists an extraction algorithm  $\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\mathcal{D})$  that succeed with probability at least

$$\delta_k(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{D})/k$$

## Theorem

The  $(t, \omega)$ -fixed-weight repetition of a  $k$ -out-of- $N$  special-sound interactive proof is knowledge sound, with knowledge error

$$\kappa_{t,\omega} = \binom{t}{\omega}^{-1} \frac{\eta_{t,\omega}}{(N-1)^{t-\omega}},$$

where

$$\eta_{t,\omega} = \begin{cases} \binom{\omega(k-1)}{\omega} (k-2)^{\omega(k-2)} (k-1)^{t-\omega(k-1)} & \text{if } t \geq \omega(k-1) \\ \binom{t}{\omega} (k-2)^{t-\omega} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

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- $\kappa_{t,\omega}$  cannot be expressed in terms of the knowledge error of the single instance.
- However,  $\kappa_{t,\omega}$  coincides with the maximal cheating probability of a dishonest prover  $\implies$  the result is optimal!



- Our result can be extended to multi-round  $(k_1, \dots, k_\mu)$ -special-sound protocols.
- The expression for the knowledge error became quite complex (Theorem 2 in the paper)
- The result is still optimal!

### Theorem

The  $(t, \omega)$ -fixed-weight repetition of a  $(k_1, \dots, k_\mu)$ -out-of- $(N_1, \dots, N_\mu)$  special-sound interactive proof is knowledge sound.

# Knowledge Soundness of CROSS Protocol

- CROSS<sup>2</sup> is a (2, 2)-out-of-(p - 1, 2) special-sound 5-pass protocol.
- Fixed-weight optimization is employed in all parameter sets of the scheme.

## CROSS Specs

Cheating probability:

$$\sum_{l=0}^{\min(\omega, t-\omega)} \frac{\binom{\omega}{l} \binom{t-\omega}{l}}{\binom{t}{l}} (p-1)^{-2l}$$

## Our work

Knowledge error:

$$\max_{\alpha \in \{0, \dots, t\}} \sum_{l=\max(0, \omega-t+\alpha)}^{\min(\omega, \alpha)} \frac{\binom{\alpha}{l} \binom{t-\alpha}{\omega-l}}{\binom{t}{l}} (p-1)^{-(\alpha-l)-(\omega-l)}$$

<sup>2</sup>Baldi, Barengli, Bitzer, Karl, Manganiello, Pavoni, Pelosi, Santini, Schupp, Slaughter, Wachter-Zeh, and Weger. CROSS – Codes and Restricted Objects Signature Scheme.

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The expressions coincide for  $\alpha = \omega$ , which is not always the case for CROSS parameter sets.

This does not immediately translate to CROSS parameters after the application of Fiat-Shamir!

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## Summary:

- The fixed-weight repetition of (multi-round) interactive proofs is knowledge-sound.
- Explicit expression of adversary's cheating probability against  $(k_1, \dots, k_\mu)$ -special-sound protocols.
- The knowledge error matches the optimal cheating probability.

## Future works:

- Investigate the non-interactive case.
- Extend to “generalized” fixed-weight optimization for intermediate rounds.



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**Thank you!**